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 Strategic Assembly - the comprehensive and coordinated use of internal 
development, mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and alliances - is a novel approach 
to the construction and management of global firms.  This paper describes the role and 
characteristics of strategic assembly in the construction and management of the Global 
Multi-Business Firm, an emerging form of global organization. We present a study of 
Group Renault and its relationship with two key players in the lucrative and emerging 
market for autos in Turkey, emphasizing the coevolutionary processes through which 
local players enter and dominate a local market and the global parent, utilizing local 
learning and organization, adapts to the global environment.  We conclude with a call to 
action for research on the relationship between the strategic logic of global assemblers 
and the strategies of the firms at multiple levels of analysis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of the multinational firm as a strategic entity, rather than simply a way of 
organizing foreign markets through direct investment, first emerged in the work of 
Stephen Hymer (1976).  The multinational at that time was described as a hierarchy 
with host country subsidiaries adapting the products and capabilities of the parent firm 
to local markets; the parent firm largely focused on financial control of its dispersed 
units.  By the late 1980s, this model had become outdated, and Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1989) proposed the novel idea of the transnational firm – a less bureaucratic firm with a 
networked organization, differentiated subsidiary roles, and control based largely on 
organizational culture and administrative heritage. Today, the transnational model 
provides a less adequate approach to the evolving modern global firm.  We have 
identified the Global Multi-Business Firm (GMBF) as a more appropriate model, one 
which incorporates the insights of earlier models, but recognizes that an evolving 
international business environment, new technologies, and more sophisticated 
managerial competences have fundamentally changed the strategic face of global 
business (Tallman and Koza, 2010). A key aspect of the GMBF is its creation and 
strategic organization, rooted in a process of strategic assembly. This paper develops a 
conceptual approach to strategic assembly in the GMBF and reports the results of an 
illustrative case study in the global automobile industry, which focuses on the micro-
level processes by which a global player and two local joint ventures both serve a local 
market and play multiple roles in the global business firm. 
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Strategic assembly is the process of constructing a business firm in a calculated 
and forward-looking manner with the intention of gaining and maintaining competitive 
advantage under the dynamic environmental and competitive conditions facing that firm. 
It requires capabilities in designing and managing complex inter-organizational 
relationships, including, but not limited to, joint ventures, equity and non-equity 
alliances, networks, and acquisitions to capture or access external resources as well as 
competencies for internal development of complex dynamic capabilities to match the 
uncertain and ever-changing environment (Tallman and Koza, 2010).  A substantial 
body of scholarship assesses the dyadic and multi-lateral characteristics of 
organizational relationships, and their role in the construction of traditional multinational 
firms. However, surprisingly little research has focused on the connections between 
these complex inter-organizational relationships and the strategic objectives and 
perspectives of co-evolving global firms (Koza and Lewin, 1998, 1999). Strategic 
assembly, in this sense, refers to the comprehensive and coordinated use of a 
multiplicity of inter-organizational relationships, as well as internal development, to 
construct and manage the GMBF. 
Strategic assembly must 1) provide the GMBF with varied, flexible, and 
adaptable assets from many sources and the capabilities to deploy (and reconsider and 
redeploy) these assets effectively; 2) exploit the characteristics and differences of 
multiple locations, but in a world where ‘the nation’ is no longer adequate as a 
description of the essence of place; 3) provide access to and coordination of globally 
sourced high-value resources, but not necessarily through ownership or internal 
hierarchical control; and 4) reflect a global strategic perspective on markets, but also on 
innovation, production, and distribution, that requires strategic purpose in considering 
any asset, in any location, for inclusion and integration through any means of 
governance. The GMBF responds to and influences its environment both globally and in 
each location that it touches. 
 In the next section, we explore the strategic evolution of the multinational firm, 
emphasizing the emergence of the Global Multi-Business Firm. We then describe the 
role and characteristics of strategic assembly in the construction and management of 
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the GMBF, with emphasis on the multi-level co-evolutionary processes through which 
such an organization is created (Lewin and Koza, 2001). Next, the paper presents a 
study of Group Renault and its relationship with two key players in the lucrative and 
emerging market for autos in Turkey.  We conclude with a call to action for research on 
the relationship between the strategic logic of global assemblers and the strategies of 
the firms at multiple levels of analysis. 
GLOBAL STRATEGIES FOR AN EVOLVING WORLD 
We observe three stages of international firms – multinational, transnational, and global 
multi business. Modal firms in each stage have coevolved with the changing global 
business environment, corporate strategies, and certain administrative characteristics of 
the organization. While significant well documented variation exists within each stage of 
our model, the evolution of global strategy and the role of management are captured 
best by the between group variation and the trajectory of strategic change over time. 
The focus of international strategies began as the need to adapt to differences in 
demand across national and cultural boundaries for firms faced with limitations in 
communication and information technologies, resulting in local production rather than 
home country exports to satisfy differentiated local demand (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Rugman, 1981).  Globally homogeneous strategies were uncommon outside primary 
product sectors – the required similarities of demand were largely absent and the 
resources and capabilities required for a more sophisticated approach to global markets 
were available to only a few firms. Since even modified products or services tend to 
appeal to a relatively narrow customer base, international expansion within the home 
region or to carefully selected, culturally and institutionally similar, markets elsewhere in 
the world limited most firms to a regional strategic perspective (Rugman, 2005). The 
strategic demands on early multinational firms were often related to growth through 
diversification of markets, with central control of financial activities through capital 
allocation and management. For the few global firms, command and control extended to 
product and process input decisions, seeking economies of scale in manufacturing to 
gain cost advantages (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). 
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More recently, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) introduced the concept of the 
Transnational Firm, which shifted the focus of global strategy away from the tension 
between local market portfolios and scale-based economies toward satisfying both of 
these demands while also leveraging knowledge assets and organizational capabilities 
across national borders. As a result of these innovative ideas, management research 
shifted away from command and control toward an approach based on behavioral 
consistency attained through matrix management, corporate culture and coordinated, 
rather than independent or unified, relationships between subordinate units and with the 
headquarters. We recognize how far the evolution from multinational to transnational 
approach has taken international strategy research. However, the time now is right to 
consider a new approach to global strategy and organization due to continuing 
development of the global context, including the rise of new market economies, 
revolutions in communication and transportation technologies, and vastly improved 
managerial capabilities for managing complex organizations. These forces have 
produced an evolution in the management and design of global firms. 
International companies of today are embedded in an environment that has 
become chaotic, that is to say, both the direction and pace of change is unpredictable. 
Local tastes and preferences are in flux, the meaning of ‘global’ is revised regularly, and 
knowledge creation, transfer, application, and leakage all occur at an increasingly rapid 
pace.  Uncertainty and risk are pervasive (Tallman, 1992). We have argued elsewhere 
(Tallman and Koza, 2010) that a deeper understanding of the structure of dynamic 
global strategies will clarify the most recent evolution of the responsibilities of the global 
headquarters and of the evolution of the multinational enterprise and its strategies. 
While characteristics of the first two models, as summarized above, are well known, the 
GMBF requires elaboration (See Figure 1 for a representation of the different 
organizations).  
 Insert Figure 1. Globalization Stages and Organizing Structures 
The GMBF construct proposes that, in a rapidly changing international business 
environment, managers of contemporary firms pursuing global strategies follow a 
twofold approach to strategy by first assembling the global company, the focus of the 
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present paper, and second animating the total enterprise’s capacity for self-renewal 
(Tallman and Koza, 2010). Managing the resulting organization likewise requires a two-
part approach. First, managers must understand that emergent processes both for 
exploiting existing resources and capabilities and for exploring for new or evolving 
assets are essential to establish competitive advantage (March, 1991; Koza and Lewin 
1998, 1999). Second, they must recognize that the critical control mechanisms to 
support that task involve establishing, maintaining, and enabling communication and 
information networks throughout the worldwide firm’s network.  The senior management 
task is no longer the control of worldwide operations in detail, nor is it expected that the 
firm will become one giant integrated operation with a single culture. Indeed, these 
modes of operation often are seen to be disadvantages. Rather, the “internalized 
market” for knowledge and other resources (Buckley and Casson, 1976) has become 
more prevalent, with the visible and strong hand of the central headquarters replaced by 
a form of direction in which selection of the relevant components and provision of the 
appropriate inspiration, motivation, and empowerment is decentralized, providing the 
many parts of the organization with economic and social incentives, rather than 
hierarchical demands, to work with a unified purpose.  
An important aspect of the GMBF construct is the specific definition of “business” 
that we apply in this model.  We find that the casual concept of a firm with an internal 
value-adding process chain to deliver a product to an industry sector as constituting a 
business is obsolescent in many ways.  This is notable from a variety of perspectives, 
but is perhaps most apparent in international strategy.  The growing use of offshore 
production, not just of inexpensive hard goods, but of high-end services, product 
development, research, and so forth, and the concomitant growth in the use of 
outsourced suppliers for economic activities that until recently were considered as the 
essence of the firm have forced recognition that value-adding chains can be dispersed 
geographically and governed efficiently through non-hierarchical means.  We shall see 
that the essence of strategic assembly is the choice of which value-adding stages 
should be internal, which sourced through alliances, and which left to the market, with 
the global firm focused on integrating the value-adding processes rather than controlling 
their sources.  In this new world, each value-adding activity is potentially a profitable 
7 
 
business for an outsourcer, and truly understanding the process of integrating the chain 
of activities must recognize this.  Therefore, we believe that any firm that incorporates 
multiple separable value-adding activities (to include the linking actions that integrate 
the chain) should be seen as a multi business. This concept goes beyond treating 
internal divisions as profit centers, with an artificial recognition of costs, revenues, and 
margins. It also goes far beyond Chandler’s (1962) M-Form or multi-divisional firm. In 
our model, each traditional product division would be a multi business firm itself. The 
global firm as an “internal market” (Buckley and Casson, 1976) becomes much more 
real when we contemplate each of its essential activities as a separable, if not separate, 
business that could well be out-sourced under only slightly changed circumstances – 
and then brought back into the firm as a dynamic environment changes again. This 
model also points up the essential quality of strategic animation as opposed to 
command and control – multiple businesses that happen to be under the same 
ownership roof cannot be managed as a bureaucratic hierarchy.  
Rather than the bureaucratic mandates of a hierarchy, the parts of the GMBF 
achieve integration through what we would call “incentivized voluntarism”. That is, when 
the managers of the assembled subsidiary and affiliated businesses see that their own 
best interests are served through the GMBF, they will work in concert.  This is, of 
course, an age-old challenge in management: how to design structures and processes 
that align individuals’ contributions with the strategy of the firm without stifling initiative. 
However, solutions to this ancient challenge require new managerial skills in the GMBF. 
Harnessing “self organization” - the natural tendency for humans to spontaneously 
organize in order to pursue individual goals through collective activities and aims - for 
the good of the firm, is necessary, as is providing a moral center embodying key values, 
norms, and traditions of the organization (Shils, 1975; Koza and Thoenig, 2003). 
Managers must provide incentives, resources, and empowerment in such a way that 
individuals and subordinate organizations motivate themselves to provide superior 
performance. 
The GMBF does not render obsolete either the multinational or the transnational, 
but incorporates and transforms each into a newly sophisticated structure. The 
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individual units remain somewhat independent, with loose administrative and close 
financial oversight. They are drawn through formal and informal ties into relatively dense 
interconnected networks of interacting elements with global headquarters providing 
communication and coordination as well as trans-border goals and purpose. However, 
these networks are assembled with an eye more toward flexibility and restructuring than 
toward static efficiency. Finally, many of these individual business networks are pulled 
together by the corporate center and provided with the incentives to pursue their own 
objectives in the pursuit of the overall GMBF’s goals.  At this level of organization, we 
see loose administrative controls (operational management devolving to the business 
level) with tight financial controls (both in assembly and animation of the portfolio of 
divisions and businesses).  
Thus, the GMBF may be summarized as a corporation with a collection of 
divisions in which each division is organized into multiple business units. Within-division 
integration is achieved through organizational characteristics similar to the transnational 
(common organizational capabilities, matrix management, organizational culture, 
administrative heritage, and the like), but with an increased emphasis on location of 
individual activity/businesses and on network forms of organization. At the same time, 
diversification of both markets and processes provides many of the risk-stabilization 
characteristics of the multinational form.  The GMBF is an emergent form of 
organization, which derives from the collective characteristics attributable to both the 
multinational and transnational form, with additional emphasis on leadership through 
animation, enabling emergent process, communication control, and strategic assembly 
(Tallman and Koza, 2010). This approach provides 1) the potential, but often illusive, 
benefits of the transnational and the multinational, while limiting the challenges of either 
and 2) an adaptive approach uniquely suited to chaotic environments.  
STRATEGIC ASSEMBLY IN THE GLOBAL MULTI-BUSINESS FIRM: THE FIRST 
IMPERATIVE 
 The first stage in building and managing a global multi-business firm is the 
strategic assembly of the organization. The challenge derives from the necessity to 
access simultaneously geographic and product markets or market segments, 
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managerial competencies and skills, and technologies and brands. Location must be 
exploited to arbitrage differences and find commonalities, requiring a newly 
sophisticated definition of location-tied advantage and sensitivity to the importance of 
maintaining local character while offering opportunities for combining assets at a global 
level. It involves the traditional vehicles of internal development and acquisition, as well 
as the full range of strategic alliances, partnerships, networks, and inter-company 
relationships necessary for success in the global marketplace (c.f. Chakrabarti, Vidal 
and Mitchell, this issue). It also requires variably close coordination among the various 
constituent subunits of the organization, but in a flexible and responsive manner, not a 
set hierarchy with standardized roles. Global strategy is the happy middle that brings 
together the supply and demand side, recognizing both firm and location demands on 
both sides.2 
Thus, strategic assembly in the GMBF is an aspect of a style of management 
rather than a specific location or category of governance (see, for example, Yip, 1992). 
European, Anglophone or Francophone, Commonwealth membership, regional free-
trade ties, etc. are all unique geographic combinations that may be managed as a 
GMBF, each producing specific assembly benefits and challenges.  Companies as 
diverse as The Tata group, L-3 Communications, General Electric (Govindarajan and 
Rmamurti, this issue), AREVA, Aviva, and Nestle are converging on the GMBF form, 
evidencing both the diversification and financial controls of the Multinational and the 
integration, organizational learning, and coaching of the Transnational, with the 
centrality of strategic assembly as a common denominator. 
 








The first concern in strategic assembly is identifying resources and 
understanding how they combine to generate competitive advantage3. The usual 
resource story in strategic management focuses on accumulating strategic, or rent-
yielding, assets and capabilities within the firm (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) where 
ownership rights to these resources provide quasi-rents to the firm (Peteraf, 1993). 
Complementary resources, sometimes belonging to partners, are recognized as 
beneficial, even essential at times, to the ability of the firm to fully exploit its own rent-
yielding resources (Teece, 1986). However, the focus has been on strategic control 
through ownership, and in the case of the multinational firm, ownership by the parent 
firm and typically in the home country (Dunning, 1993).   Higher level organizational 
capabilities for organizing (Penrose, 1959), recombining (Kogut and Zander, 1992), and 
providing dynamic capacity for re-assembling (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) these 
rent-generating resources are seen as the core of corporate strategic advantage and 
define the strategic posture of the firm (Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). 
 Strategic assembly calls for a more nuanced perspective on the resources that 
are to be assembled into the firm because classic distinctions among strategic, 
complementary, co-specialized, and other types of resources can become misleading.  
If a firm has a defensible patent on a unique product technology, but is unable to 
embody that technology in a unique product to be offered at a fair price to potential 
consumers, is this a strategic resource?  Or is this technology actually a complementary 
resource for a global multi-business firm that has capabilities to manage production, 
marketing, and world-wide distribution businesses that offer distinctive value, needing 
only some content to be set in action?  Consider the case of Li & Fung, the Hong Kong-
based trading company with an asset base consisting largely of a massive contact list 
and well-honed capabilities for assembling virtual value-adding chains on short notice; 
Li & Fung does not make anything, or even in some sense DO anything internally, yet it 
is becoming a model for the highly profitable modern global firm.  In global business 








knowledge asset, and more a matter of rapidly assembling appropriate resources at a 
reasonable cost in response to a specific customer demand.  Process management 
through dynamic managerial capabilities is key to competitive advantage in chaotic or 
even rapidly evolving markets – the skills to be in the right place at the right time at the 
right price are supplanting the ability to have the perfect product with the latest 
technology. 
If simple technological assets are losing their luster as sources of competitive 
advantage to complex capabilities for dynamic and flexible organization, then ownership 
of resource property rights is not necessarily important to competitive advantage. 
Rather, access to the outputs of unique assets and capabilities is.4 Indeed, ownership of 
assets and operational capabilities, particularly in an evolving or chaotic environment, is 
likely to be a limiting factor on the ability of the firm to respond to emergent challenges, 
as sunk costs, deeply embedded processes, organizational identities, and other such 
drivers of organizational inertia make rapid adaptation problematic. Owning asset stocks 
may have advantages, but only to the degree that they reduce the risk of unresponsive 
asset flows (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). The environment of the GMBF is the epitome of 
such a challenging context.  Therefore, the first issue of resource identification for 
strategic assembly is not ownership of, but access to, resources. What we can do with 
our resource base, our assets and capabilities, is important; whether we ‘own’ these 
assets is less so. A combination of identity, reputation, organizational skills, dynamic 
flexibility, and global access lies at the core of competitive advantage for the GMBF, 
and strategic assembly must pull together assets and capabilities that maintain 
competencies in combination and recombination, in rapid adaptation and change of 
direction, to sustain competitive advantage. 
Where to Find Assets: A Note on Location  
                                                            
4 For example, oil is necessary if you are in the refinery business, but oil wells may not be if you trust that 
intermediate product markets must eventually clear. In the case of Apple, the ‘twin touch’ screen that 
makes the iPhone unique in feel and operation is produced by a supplier, and the technology is 
contracted to, but not controlled by, Apple. However, the full value of this unique technology was realized 
only in the complex system of purchased parts and technologies that was the iPhone – and Apple profited 
far more than the technology holder. 
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Strategic assembly in the global context requires a nuanced assessment of the 
meaning of location in accessing the resources and capabilities to be assembled into 
the GMBF. A key aspect of all international strategy is the use of location-tied 
comparative advantage to improve firm-level competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace. Traditionally, comparative advantage has been tied to the nation-state, but 
a unique distinction of the national context is no longer adequate to capture significant 
distinctions within multinational strategy, whether market seeking or asset seeking 
strategy. Some authors have shifted to considering “the nation” as a part of the 
environment, much like a regional trade agreement, rather than the essential element of 
location; a useful perspective as we move from the multi-national firm to the global firm 
(Tallman and Jenkins, 2007). Regional trade agreements matter, national laws and 
regulations and language and religious affinities matter, but so do resource conditions 
and learning opportunities at much smaller scale. In Scott’s concept of global city-
regions (Scott et al., 2002), country matters as part of the political-economic setting, but 
the location of economic comparative advantage is at the city-region level.  The rising 
interest in industrial districts or clusters (Porter, 1998; Tallman et al., 2004) suggests 
that both scholars and practitioners have come to see that location is essential to global 
strategy, but country is not the key unit of analysis.  
Rugman’s (2005) insights on regional sales and marketing strategies suggest 
that the relevant markets for GMBFs may function at the continental level, particularly 
when an international trade agreement links geographically close countries. On the 
other hand, for those looking at sourcing strategies city-level regional strategies or 
countries aligned by other affinities (for example, Benelux, NAFTA, or industry specific 
multilateral national or local coalitions) might be more relevant. (Tallman et al. 2004; 
Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). A global strategic perspective encompasses 
any of these and the national level, with an essential challenge being to identify the 
appropriate geographic construct to apply to various decisions. Sales are useful metrics 
- the numbers suggest that international firms tend to find markets in their home region 
primarily and secondarily tend to sell into one alternative continental market (Rugman, 
2005). However, if the goods and services being sold are made on another continent, or 
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even multiple continents (and financed in Dubai, with logistics managed through Hong 
Kong and engineering design in Mumbai), a key question is why the nation or region in 
which sales or direct production of final goods takes place is considered to be the 
uniformly correct measure of international diversity. Trade economists may find this 
comforting, but global strategy should not accept any specific geographical unit as the 
unique metric for all activities. 
The relevant unit in a geographic search for assets depends greatly on the 
degree of specificity of the resources being assembled.  It has become a commonplace 
that any international firm benefits from dispersing its value-adding activities to locations 
where they are most productive – labor-intensive manufacturing to China, IT support to 
India, and so forth. Strategic assembly of a global multi-business firm certainly requires 
recognition of such basic applications of comparative advantage, but must go much 
further – just any manufacturer in China or a random selection of IT provider from 
Mumbai may source an activity, but hardly in a strategic manner.  Rather, GMBFs must 
understand their own resources and organizations in detail in order to identify the most 
suitable locations in which to complement their own strengths.  Such an ever-refined 
search process may scatter activities across a broad geography, or it may produce a 
much more concentrated focus (Porter, 1986), with an outcome that may not seem to 
be global at all.  However, if a global perspective on the best sources of complementary 
resources results in choosing a supplier from across the street, this hardly makes the 
GMBF less global in its assembly strategy. 
Governing Assembly: Access, Capture, or Control of Assets 
Early models of the multinational firm focused on the choice between using 
market means or internal hierarchical controls to transmit intermediate assets among 
international activities (Buckley and Casson, 1976). The definition of the multinational 
firm was tied closely to wholly owned and hierarchically controlled subsidiary/division 
operations in multiple countries, intended primarily to apply centrally developed 
knowledge assets in diversified markets while limiting the threat from opportunistic 
partners. In a previous section, we proposed that ownership of resources is no longer 
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the key to strategic advantage, or to strategic assembly. In this section, we develop the 
idea that hierarchical governance, typically through ownership and tight central control 
of subsidiary organizations, of geographically dispersed operations that apply and 
exploit these assets is likewise of fading importance. 
The separation of ownership from control and overall operational control from 
control of specific resources has been established in alliance situations for some time 
(Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), but applies equally to strategic assembly at the corporate 
level of analysis. Strategic assembly in the GMBF is a question of insightful organization 
of businesses, knowledge of process, identification of asset availability, and speed and 
accuracy in assembly – and disassembly once the opportunity has passed in order to 
make way for the next round of assembly. The need to restructure an assembly of 
businesses in the face of an evolving – or erupting – external situation argues that 
ownership is not only unnecessary in many cases, but is actually to be avoided.  
Possessions only slow down strategic response to change, and when co-evolution 
under chaotic conditions is the essence of competitive advantage, responsiveness is 
everything. Dynamic capabilities that encourage organizational learning must be 
complemented by flexible governance, capable of rapid reorganization and with a light 
touch to retain the value of resources that are pulled together for specific purposes, 
special opportunities, or unique conditions of demand or supply.  Tight hierarchical 
oversight is not the optimum approach to governing for such conditions. 
Rather, strategic assembly in the GMBF concept fits very much with the concept 
of the multinational firm as network organization (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), but one that 
makes no clear distinction between the ‘internal network’ of wholly or majority-owned 
subsidiaries and the ‘external network’ of joint ventures and contractual alliances with 
affiliated firms. The rise of offshore outsourcing both for value-adding operations and for 
support services or ‘business processes’ is an indication that firms are becoming more 
comfortable not only with performing vital activities in locations that offer the greatest 
productivity, but with contracting for the services of local outsourcing specialists.  A 
popular example is Apple’s production of its popular iPods and iPhones.  Apple itself 
does the design and marketing for its products, but contracts with suppliers around the 
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world to make the components and perform assembly on these popular items. Twenty 
years ago, sourcing critical components, even designing in critical technologies that 
belong to other firms, for products that were essential to the success of the company 
would have been seen as taking an extreme risk. Today, this approach to strategic 
assembly seems quite normal.  Apple has had great success using this system, but 
through its unique capabilities for design and consumer connection, not because it is 
alone in using a network of specialist suppliers. 
Strategic assembly in which the focal firm tightly controls few hard assets and 
even relatively few knowledge resources, but bases its success on capabilities for 
identifying the sources and locations of superior competencies and integrating these 
multiple independent businesses into single value chain for the period of time needed to 
service a customer’s needs, and to then to move on, reflects changes in both context 
and firm. The modern international business environment offers much more intensive 
communication and information analysis due to technological advances. Transferring 
information, supervising its application, and monitoring for violations of contractual 
arrangements are much more efficient and timely activities that in even the recent past. 
In the modern global context, openness in the name of cutting edge discovery is more 
important to sustained competitive advantage than is careful protection of rapidly 
obsolescing stocks of established knowledge (Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist 2002).  
Indeed, the ‘mutual hostage’ aspect of equity joint ventures, critical from a static 
internalization perspective (Hennart 1988), seems almost quaint in technology intensive 
industries, where redistributing existing information may be of greater importance 
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Reuer and Koza, 2000A, 2000B). Equity ties may be 
more anchors than safeguards when finding the newest ideas from the most 
unexpected (distant) source is key to dealing with the insatiable appetite for novelty and 
innovation that characterizes the technology sector.   
The need for defensive internalization, internal control to protect against 
opportunism in transaction partners, has been alleviated to a growing extent by 
monitoring and immediate reputational effects. Opportunistic strategies don’t pay when 
the misappropriated assets quickly lose their value and communication technology 
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means that the MNE partner (and everyone else in the relevant field) quickly knows of 
any malfeasance. Reputation suffers rapidly, but few benefits accrue to the 
untrustworthy. As information technology, modern travel, and familiarity with business 
and technical concepts have become widespread across much of the world, the past 
benefits of internal communication and relationships in comparison to arms’ length 
market relationships have been greatly reduced.  The GMBF will not eliminate the 
wholly-owned subsidiary, the country manager, or the equity joint venture, but is likely to 
shift 1) their strategic importance, and 2) the preponderance of governance more 
toward contracts and alliances. Whole ownership will remain appropriate for key 
‘strategic leader’ subsidiaries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), but subsidiaries performing 
definable activities, whether offshore suppliers or sales and marketing operations, will 
not need the protection – but at the expense of flexibility and management time – of 
equity investment.  
The Strategic Purpose of Assets 
The final key to strategic assembly, and the one that determines the value of the 
other three, is the strategy behind the assembly, the intended strategic purpose of the 
assets and businesses under consideration for the GMBF.  The value and importance of 
any specific resources and capabilities, the relevant characteristics of a particular 
location, and the need for more or less intense governance of the businesses that pull 
these assets together should all be dictated by the strategic objectives driving this 
particular assembly. The launch of a new global product line or a unique customer 
solution entails pulling together an entire value-added chain of businesses. This will 
likely mean a combination of internal capabilities and resources into internal 
businesses; possibly adding new businesses through acquisitions of other resources 
such as technologies, or of firms that hold such resources; contracting with external 
businesses for yet other intermediate products or service provision; and re-evaluations 
of existing arrangements to improve efficiency, take advantage of previous 
relationships, and consolidate similar business activities. Locations around the globe will 
need to be given consideration both as suppliers and as markets. Further, the issue of 
where to access different resources with different economic drivers (cheap labor, 
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technological sophistication, capital access, etc.) will mean finer division of the 
upstream and downstream into multiple steps and links in the value-adding process. 
Finally, a variety of transactional governance mechanisms are likely to be needed, from 
market purchases to contractual alliances, to internalization of the means of 
coordinating the system. 
The global strategic intent of the GMBF and of its constituent businesses must 
inform these selections of resources, locations, and governance. Market-seeking 
strategies may focus on capabilities for organizing efficient supply chains, with the 
value-added links located for the greatest productivity, and with flexible governance that 
can adapt to regional or national demand characteristics. Offshore production strategies 
are likely to focus on clusters of excellence, where cost-effective skills or assets can be 
accessed, whether through contracts and partnerships (cheap and flexible) or through 
direct investment (more expensive, but providing long-term potential), in places where 
they are most productive. Access to knowledge asset development and innovation 
requires dynamic capabilities for building, rather than exploiting, technical 
competencies, in conjunction with local innovators, possibly through shared-equity 
ventures, in locations offering unique assets that can be combined with global firm-
specific assets to generate sustainable competitive advantage. 
In other cases, though, even global firms must make entry into individual markets 
and/ or asset sites with a variety of constraints. Geographical, cultural, institutional, and 
economic distances can work against the ability to market goods produced in one 
location in another place – the potential consumers may resistant, costs may be too 
high, or product characteristics just wrong.  Getting these parts of the global strategy 
paradigm right means assembling the right combinations of resources and capabilities 
for any specific situation, and doing this assembly in the optimal locations for the 
product and market. Regional or even local value provision may be more important than 
global cost minimization, shipping costs may be more than just freight charges, or the 




The top managers of the GMBF must have a sense of strategic purpose or 
purposes before they begin the process of strategic assembly. Without this integration 
of strategic vision and purpose with the practical considerations of what, where, and 
how the firm as a bundle of resources and capabilities is to be assembled, we fall back 
into tactical considerations or even inertia – repeating previous patterns without 
purpose.  We may have assembly of a firm, but it is hardly strategic.  
STRATEGIC ASSEMBLY: A CO-EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE  
The strategic assembly of the GMBF is an outcome of the co-evolution of a local 
business organization, including, but not limited to, its assets, capabilities, markets, and 
strategy with the strategy and relevant organizational attributes of the parent. This multi 
level and iterative process produces adaptation for the local player but, also, global 
market adaptation for the parent in which the local player is embedded (c.f. Koza and 
Lewin, 1998, 1999 and Lewin and Koza, 2001). Included in this process is the founding, 
growth and evolution of local subsidiary operations as well as repatriation and 
absorption of knowledge - organizational learning - to the parent, supporting 
organizational renewal and corporate transformation necessary for global adaptation. 
This argument builds on March (1991), Levinthal and March (1993), Koza and Lewin 
(1998, 1999), and Lewin and Volberda, (1999), and others who have called attention to 
the complex interdependencies in organizational fields necessary for adaptation to 
environmental discontinuities. 
 Tallman and Koza (2010) advanced a complimentary view of the GMBF in which 
strategic assembly is a core responsibility of senior management, necessary for 
adaptation to the global environment.  Strategic assembly, in this view, elevates the 
historic challenge of managing mergers, acquisitions, alliances, joint ventures, internal 
development, and the like, to the center of strategic activity of corporate leadership. 
However, while the view of the GMBF advanced in that study suggests the importance, 
form and process of strategic assembly and its centrality to the adaptive capability of the 
GMBF, additional work understanding the concrete co-evolutionary processes through 
which these actions occur is necessary for further theory development.  The following 
study of Group Renault and the Turkish auto sector begins to fill this void, exploring the 
19 
 
co-evolutionary micro level processes of strategic assembly in one emerging market 
context. 
The Case of Group Renault and the Turkish Auto Sector 
Case studies have achieved a growing acceptance as a means for deriving 
grounded theory, drawing inferences on causal relations, and isolating holistic 
regularities of organizational phenomenon. Simon (1947) identifies the intellectual value 
of case studies in organizational research. He argues that case studies could provide 
useful descriptions of the great variations in organizational structure and process. More 
recently, several scholars have argued that case studies can have a useful and 
important function as opportunities for reflection and for deriving new insights (Glasser 
and Strauss, 1967; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Yin, 1989). Others argue that case studies, 
in addition to providing useful description can be utilized to understand the verstehen or 
subjective experience of actors (Koza and Lewin, 1999).  Following Weber (1968), we 
view longitudinal case studies as both unique opportunities for empirical and theoretical 
interpretation, and a means of developing a co-evolutionary understanding of parent/ 
local subsidiary relationships. 
In this paper, we use the case study of Group Renault and its activities and 
organizations in the Turkish marketplace for the purpose of elaborating a set of ideas 
and concepts necessary for understanding strategic assembly. The unit of analysis will 
be the multiple decision events associated with the relationship, including founding, 
learning, reconfiguration, repatriation of technology, and global adaptation and diffusion. 
Thus, the object of the case analysis is to elaborate and interpret the co-evolution of the 
Renault/Renault-Turkey relationship with the objective of exploring the dynamics of the 
relationship as it reflects the strategic assembly concept over time. 
The case was chosen for four primary reasons.  First, Group Renault meets the 
definition of a Global Multi-Business Firm, operating on a world-wide basis in multiple 
businesses organized into relatively autonomous divisions.  Second, Group Renault has 
conducted business over a long period of time, encompassing activity throughout the 
“multi-national era”, providing a unique research site to examine issues of strategic 
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assembly and the GMBF.  Third, the case is longitudinal and ongoing, with Group 
Renault currently engaged in programs to reevaluate its adaptation to the global auto 
environment. Finally, Group Renault comes closest to typifying the GMBF, based on the 
authors’ research with multiple companies on a world-wide basis. These characteristics 
are central to the idea of strategic assembly, making this case a useful opportunity to 
explore the power of the concept. 
A snowball sampling approach (c.f. Laumann and Pappi, 1976) was used to 
enumerate the census of actors involved in the Renault/Turkey relationship. An initial 
group of three managers were selected, based on their position, and asked to nominate 
additional relevant individuals.  These individuals were interviewed and asked to 
nominate additional informants.  When an informant was nominated at least twice 
she/he was included in the sample. In sum we had 23 nominations who met criteria for 
inclusion, of which we were able to interview 21 (the remaining two had retired and were 
not available for interview). Table I lists the individuals by position interviewed. 
Insert Table I: 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with each respondent to identify key 
elements in the formation, evolution and management practices of the relationship. The 
interviews were designed to produce a narrative of Renault’s entry and expansion into 
the Turkish marketplace, while also exploring the potential benefits to Renault of this 
initiative. Archive and documentary material relating to each of the entities were 
explored to corroborate the interview responses and provide additional detail.  The team 
was fortunate in being allowed to consult internal strategic assessments of the 
relationship. Two of the authors independently developed a case interpretation based 
on the interviews and documentary evidence, which were reconciled, where necessary, 
through discussion. Following Kimberly (1987), results of our analysis were shared with 
senior managers of Group Renault to corroborate our findings and interpretations. We 
begin our analysis by presenting background on the Turkish automobile sector, and the 




1) Does the case illustrate the elements of strategic assembly described above: 
asset identification and location-based advantage, transactional structure, and 
strategic purpose?  
2) How has Renault, through its local relationships, survived and adapted 
successfully in the Turkish emerging market? What challenges did it face? How 
did Group Renault influence local practice? 
3) In what ways have the local joint ventures provided technology, capability, 
product, skills, and the like back to the parent facilitating global learning and 
competitive advantage? What are the specific mechanisms of and obstacles to 
transfer? Has transfer benefitted Renault in additional markets? 
 
The Turkish Automobile Sector and Group Renault 
The Turkish Auto Sector Turkey has a dynamic automotive sector, with more 
than 15 vehicle manufacturers (including Renault, Toyota, Honda and Fiat Tofas), 
almost 1,000 parts suppliers, and an annual output of more than one million vehicles. At 
present, more than three-quarters of output is exported, although the automotive 
industry increasingly focuses more closely on its domestic market as demand is 
expected to surge. Turkey is experiencing strong growth (5% in 2007) and household 
ownership for cars is relatively low at just 214 vehicles per 1,000 people. Prospects for 
growth, according to industry analysts, are strong. 
Group Renault, one of the world's pioneering automakers, is also one of 
Europe's largest full service auto firms. Renault's annual revenue of more than $55 
billion, along with its payroll of more than 130,000 employees in 2004, also makes it one 
of France's flagship corporations. Renault manufactures automobiles independently and 
in partnership with, amongst others, Renault-Nissan Motor in Japan, Dacia in Romania, 
Renault-Samsung Motors in Korea, and Dong Feng Motors in China. In addition to the 
company's automobile division, Renault's finance division is one of Europe’s largest 
credit providers, principally underwriting the purchase of the company's automobiles.  
Group Renault is a key player with historic presence in the Turkish automotive 
sector. The Group, which will celebrate 40 years in Turkey in 2009 through its 
subsidiary Oyak-Renault, is the leader in the national car market. Its models such as the 
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Symbol and the Mégane sedan, are particularly popular with Turkish customers. 
Moreover, for Renault, Turkey not only is a key local market but also a base for exports 
of finished and intermediate products, skills, and capabilities to the Mediterranean, 
Eastern Europe, Russia and North Africa 
Renault Turkey: OYAK-Renault is co-owned by OYAK (Turkish Armed Forces 
Pension Fund) and Renault. OYAK owns 49% and Renault owns 51% of the company. 
OYAK-Renault originally manufactured the Renault 12 family of passenger cars; while 
later production included the Renault 9, Renault 19, Renault 21, Renault Megane 
Sedan, Renault Clio, Renault Fluence, and other passenger car models, as well as 
commercial vehicles and power train components (engines, gearboxes, front and rear 
axles). With an annual production capacity of 360,000 vehicles, it is the largest Renault 
factory outside of Western Europe, and, as noted above, has significant trade 
throughout Renault subsidiaries and partnerships. Oyak Renault is the largest French 
investor and employer in Turkey. 
Renault Turkey: Mais International is focused on distribution, marketing and 
after sale services of Renault and Dacia cars in Turkey.  It was established in Turkey in 
1967 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Oyak Group. Mais is the leading car distributer 
(with 26% local market share in 2009) and it has the Turkey's largest automobile sales 
and after-sales service network. Today, Mais is structured as a joint venture between 
Renault France and Oyak Group, and is widely recognized as a key member of Group 
Renault’s international subsidiaries.  
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Renault in Turkey 
For Renault, the decision to build and extend a position in the Turkish market for 
automobiles was based on several related factors. Attractive and competitive labor 
costs compared to Western Europe and favorable tax treatment for inward foreign 
investment as early as 1951 offered significant economic inducements. While cost 
incentives have moderated in recent years; as recently as 2004, Renault estimated a 
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1000 Euro cost advantage on a 10,000 Euro car, when compared to its average unit 
cost for Western European production. Moreover, Turkey boasts a relatively low 
motorization rate (60 vehicles for 1000 persons in the 1960s to 214 vehicles in 2007) 
compared to European countries (500 vehicles per 1000 persons), offering significant 
historic and potential future growth in this market.  
Turkey sits on the border between Europe and Asia, with a significant cultural 
affinity for France, potentially facilitating entry and expansion into Asian markets and 
familiarity with Renault’s heritage management culture. Relatively free trade with the 
European Union (and hoped for inclusion in the European Community political 
structures) and the OECD promised lower threats of tariffs and other potential financial 
penalties. A large Francophone community and an educational infrastructure closely 
related to the French educational system, including several French (and English) 
language universities and institutions of higher education facilitate an educated and 
culturally complimentary work force. A quickly developing industrial sector, a young 
population (average age is 28), and an emerging middle class provide a loyal and 
educated work force. Finally, a history of stable democratic public institutions, close 
political links to the Elysee Palace, and a favorable approach to foreign ownership (a 
1954 law, for example, eliminated most taxation on profit transfers out of Turkey) linked 
to an industrial policy targeting regional dominance was a unique fit with Renault’s 
global ambitions. 
These features evolved over a period beginning for Renault in the early 1960s 
(the time period during which, we were informed, Renault management began internal 
discussions about Turkey), demonstrating a capacity of Renault managers to both 
establish a strategic ambition for the Turkish organization and to adapting it over a 
period of time as tactical opportunities present themselves. Although it is particularly 
challenging to reconstruct decision processes initiated in the early to mid 1960s, our 
informants, responding independently, unanimously emphasized the importance of 
Turkey in Renault’s internationalization strategy. They cited the importance both of the 
long-term strategic ambition of local entry and regional (and later worldwide) 
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dominance, and of the flexibility to take advantage of tactical opportunities in support of 
this ambition. 
Thus, asset Identification (please see Table II for a summary of elements of 
strategic assembly) emphasized the cost based and political considerations of the 
traditional foreign investment decision, illustrating both the co-specialization and 
synergy of Group Renault and of its Turkish assets. However, the assessment of 
location-based advantages went far beyond these important immediate concerns and 
emphasized the potential fit between the evolution of Renault in Turkey and the strategy 
of Renault on a worldwide basis.  It is interesting to note that this international 
expansion partially overlapped the period when Renault was abandoning its position in 
the US, emphasizing a world-wide position sans America, an approach more common 
in Asia-based multinationals but less so in Western Europe.  
Please Insert Table II 
The transactional structure of Renault’s activities in France relies heavily on 
equity based joint ventures (Oyak Renault and Mais International) and relationships with 
multiple suppliers. According to our most recent data, the Bursa plant, for example, 
manages relationships with at least 118 suppliers.  Renault has held between 44 (at 
founding) and 51% (today) of the equity in Oyak-Renault. Mais International is a wholly 
owned and operated subsidiary of Oyak-Renault. (Mais is also an equity joint venture of 
Oyak and Group Renault. Oyak owns 51% and Group Renault owns 49%).   
The joint venture structure offers several advantages over internalization. The 
local equity partner in Oyak Renault is the Armed Forces Pension Fund, which provides 
preferential access to talent, patient capital, and deeply embedded cultural institutions. 
Moreover, the joint venture allows for direct management control without significant 
capital investment. However, the use of partial equity in Turkey was an exception to 
Renault’s traditional foreign investment approach which emphasized full internalization 
and a subsidiary organization structure, although the model has since been adopted 
and diffused to Renault’s international organization in South America and elsewhere.  
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 Jointly and separately these elements supported Renault’s involvement from 
inception and showed a significant and balanced strategic purpose first to dominate the 
Turkish automobile market, and then, as time went on, to fulfill significant ambitions for 
the region and for emerging markets on a worldwide basis. Using an international joint 
venture as a strategic leader in key sectors is unlikely in traditional models, but should 
be expected in a GMBF. The potential for such roles is apparent in the discussion of a 
fourth perspective on IJVs by Reuer et al. in this issue (Reuer et al., 2011). 
Entry, Growth and Domination of the Turkish Market: Emerging Cooperation  
  Renault Turkey was the first and the oldest transplantation of Renault outside of 
Europe; Oyak Renault is also Renault’s first partnership experience.  Historically, 
vehicle design was engineered at TechnoCentre France with production executed in the 
Turkish plants. The Bursa plant (which started in 1971 as a simple single assembly line) 
over the last 40 years has achieved the distinction of being the biggest production plant 
of the International Operations Division of Renault and one of its first commercial hubs.  
Production runs have grown from approximately 20,000 per year in the early 1980s to 
over 160,000 vehicles by the end of the 1990 and over 360,000 today (when combined 
with complimentary Turkish plant production). The plant was selected as regional 
platform for production and export of the Mégane series of autos.  
  Renault Turkey’s reputation in Renault has blossomed over the last several 
decades. This is because of its leading market share in the Turkish marketplace, 
successful track record, and the unique capability to produce 5 models in the same 
assembly line. Quality levels, initially challenging, have grown to the second highest for 
Renault outside of France. Production costs (labor cost and spare parts) are low; the 
organization is viewed as agile and well organized. The plant is a model for integrated 
assembly and motor plant manufacturing at the same site; the two elements coordinate 
activities easily and are proud of their ability to fix problems in real time because 
people/managers working in the assembly process are in immediate proximity. The 
Human Resources Director, echoing a message heard across the company, indicated 
that teamwork spirit, trust, commitment and cohesiveness of the teams is a key feature 
of the culture. He was proud to report: 
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 …if a manager calls an employee- manager or worker- to a duty or to fix an 
urgent problem late at night or when they are on leave, employees typically 
respond immediately and come to the plant without questioning and 
complaining…when they are called by a manager, they understand immediately 
that it is important.   
 
Supporting a positive interpretation of this behavior, employee turnover is low. 
Additionally, this positive work environment helps local knowledge accumulation and 
know-how in people; little time is lost integrating new-comers. Engineers are well 
educated and experienced. It is not uncommon to find individuals who have worked for 
Renault for over 30 years. Turkish production workers routinely to visit their colleagues 
in France to co-practice, facilitating the transfer of tacit management and technical skills 
(for example, value engineering) to Turkey. 
 
Before 1993, local R&D was limited to a small number of products necessary to 
adapt traditional Renault models to local requirements and demands. A series of 
process and product improvements on the R12 and R9 were particularly successful. 
After 1993, in order to prepare for prospective custom union agreement between Turkey 
and EU, Renault France modified direction to focus on local and international activity in 
Turkey. Instead of producing older models for the Turkish market exclusively, it was 
decided to synchronize local production on new models for local and international 
markets. Due to the success of this transition, Renault has established an R&D center 
in Turkey in 2009, working on system and processes development projects. They 
proudly boast of having already applied for 48 patents. 
 Sales and marketing at Mais International followed a pattern similar to that of 
research, development, and production. Initially, skills and capabilities were transferred 
to Turkey from Renault primarily through expatriation of workers and managers from 
France (in 1990 there were 18 French managers present; 4 were in residence in 2010). 
Early international expansion was limited to exports.  Export decision, arrangements 
and agreements were typically made by Renault France, with Renault Turkey delivering 
products, including finished autos and components like drive shafts and transmissions. 
They are now exporting 89% of their productions with healthy contribution margins. 
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Renault Turkey is also “exporting” managers and knowhow. Some examples may be 
found in Table 3: 
Please Insert Table III: 
 Renault Turkey is not only transferring managers to France but also to other 
international investments of Group Renault. Experiences in Iran and Morocco are 
especially important because these managers from Turkey have taken important roles 
in the early stages of these new implants under similar conditions. 
Thus, the early period of Renault’s entry into the Turkish market could serve as a 
model for traditional notions of the foreign investment decision. Renault emphasized 
technology transfer from Paris and other European sites to the Turkish organizations. 
Partial equity stakes in local partners provided Renault with access to local market 
knowledge and relationships with key Turkish players, including governments, unions, 
suppliers, and the like.  Soon, however, local skills and capabilities developed and were 
recognized as offering significant advantages for Renault more broadly.  
Corporate Renewal and Global Positioning  
  Contributions from Turkey to Renault began with simple exports of intermediate 
and finished products, finished autos, spare parts, and components. These products 
and components produced significant benefit to Renault as it began a decade’s long 
initiative to control costs and quality.  
 Over time, several important knowledge and information sharing mechanisms 
emerged in Turkey, helping to strengthen the position of Renault as a full line global 
automaker. A training center in Turkey was initially established to train Turkish workers 
for the Turkish plants.  Over the last several years, the center has expanded its mission 
to training international workers alongside their Turkish colleagues. A well established 
program of apprenticeships and stages is offered to other Renault production teams, 
from around the group, by Renault Turkey for special projects and for skills based 
training. Every Renault plant regularly shares their best practices with others in annual 
meetings. Several “Clubs des Métier” for various professional and functional areas 
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composed of people coming from different Renault plants have been established, with 
several team members and global team leaders originating from and/or based in 
Turkey. For example, the global leader for the paint team is a Turkish manager, widely 
recognized for leading the excellent paint practice at Bursa.   
Experience in Turkey has also become important for the careers of French 
managers.  After a posting to Turkey, virtually every French expatriate manager 
received a promotion and assigned to a position of significant responsibility. One ex-GM 
who was assigned as Director of MERCOSUR; an ex- Director of Spare Parts was 
appointed Marketing Director in France and then Director of EUROMED Region. 
Teams from different countries regularly visit the Bursa plant to share 
information, to learn a new process/system or to get help from the Turkish team, 
facilitating direct relationships within and between regions without the control of Group 
Renault in headquarters. Turkish engineers audit other plants and assist them with 
appropriate improvements. Suggestion systems and international performance 
objectives on quality cost and time have become routine. Through the Renault 
International Logistics Network they export parts, components (for new model and old 
models) as well as skills in value engineering and systems integration to multiple 
Renault plants in, amongst other countries and regions, Columbia, Mexico, Brasilia, and 
Iran. A joint project with Renault France is currently underway to design and produce an 
electrical version of Renault Fluence in Turkey for world-wide markets starting in 2011. 
For managers in Turkey, however, penetrating the management culture in Paris 
was, at times, challenging. Group Renault was well known for its command and control 
heritage and historically complex, or “not invented here”, view of subsidiary initiated 
actions and programs.  While the long evolution of boundary permeability between 
Group Renault and Renault Turkey described above played a key role in producing 
cooperation, the value of champions in this process should not be discounted. One 
Board member offered the following observation to a member of the research team: 
I and several of my colleagues were convinced that we needed to value input 
and innovation from our overseas, especially emerging market, operations.  Our 
traditional insularity was becoming an obstacle to our plans and ambitions. I am 
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proud to have contributed to managing this in a constructive way with our 
colleagues in Turkey and elsewhere. Renault is a better company because of it. 
DISCUSSION: STRATEGIC ASSEMBLY AND GROUP RENAULT 
Analysis of strategic assembly in Group Renault and Renault Turkey illustrates the co-
evolving nature of the relationship and the dynamic character of global assembly. At the 
founding and in early stages, a largely asymmetric relationship between Group Renault 
and Renault Turkey predominated, with the flow of influence, technology, decision 
making, and the like originating outside of Turkey. Oyak-Renault and Mais International 
were directed to implement, with limited accommodations, Renault’s headquarters 
defined ambitions and targets in the local market. This coincided with and supported 
Renault’s heritage as a multinational organization, built on a traditional platform of 
country subsidiaries and/or divisions, with a strong command and control management 
heritage. Over time, a symmetrical relationship between the two subunits developed, 
with bilateral benefits flowing reciprocally. Today these symmetric, if not entirely 
balanced, relationships are functioning well and are contributing to the relevant parties, 
consistent with Renault’s adoption of transnational organization structure and 
processes, initiated in the early to mid 1990s. Most recently, direct relationships, 
unmediated by headquarters, among the worldwide elements of the Renault community 
is increasingly common on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, with the Turkish 
organization credited for its pioneering role.  
 Thus, Renault Turkey has emerged as a full member of the Renault community 
responsible for its local market and for critical capabilities that it is charged with 
leveraging throughout the organization, and is developing as a leader in the emerging 
market strategy for Group Renault. At the same time, Renault is renewing its 
organizational structure in line with the global multi-business organization model 
described above. One so far unanswered question in this transformation is why Renault 
Turkey is relatively absent in formal direct Group level strategy processes. From the 
GMBF perspective, though, this apparent oversight is consistent with decentralization of 
responsibilities for specific activities and informal networking among subsidiaries and 
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affiliates concerned with similar problems and with the concept that the central HQ plays 
a coordinating, not a controlling, role. 
 The findings of this data analysis are consistent with and extend current 
approaches to organizational co-evolution, and illustrate the critical role strategic 
assembly plays in the creation and management of the GMBF. The relationship 
between Renault Turkey and Group Renault follows the classic co-evolutionary bi-
variate pattern predicted in the literature and found in other studies (see, for example, 
Koza and Lewin, 1999, and Flier, et al., 2003), and illustrates multi-level dynamic 
interdependencies between the parties (Lewin and Koza, 2001).  As Group Renault has 
evolved from a multi-national firm to a transnational firm and ultimately into a global 
multi business firm, the role, structure and processes of Renault Turkey derived from 
but also supported these changes. The evolving and emerging strategy over time of 
Group Renault may be identified as a primary motive force in this process, but so too 
does the maturing of the organizational capability of Renault Turkey to play its own 
reciprocal, if embedded, causal role as a strategic leader (Birkinshaw, 1996). This is a 
joint process of realizing synergy, but also of identifying opportunities for value creation 
and the strategies and organizations that can deliver them. The strategy and structure 
of Renault Turkey is directly dependent on, but also contributes to, the strategic 
positioning of the parent corporation.  Provocatively, our findings suggest that the 
strategic assembly of Group Renault derives from a set of intended strategic changes, 
as well as unintended, but fortuitous, emerging processes that together played a critical 
role in providing adaptive responses to uncertainty, and raise questions about the roles 
of management in the long term adaptability of firms. 
 The case analysis also provides an unexpected, but serendipitous, finding 
related to strategic assembly.  Typically, literature on the evolution of multinational 
corporations has emphasized a largely deterministic view of corporate transformation.  
For example, the transformation from a multinational to a transnational organizational 
form (c.f. Bartlett and Goshal, 1989) is viewed as a unidirectional process involving the 
whole firm (albeit at different paces within the firm). Limitations on the transformational 
process are attributed to structural inertia, for example misalignment of reward, 
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measurement, incentives systems and/or administrative heritage. Our findings suggest, 
however, that prior organizational forms persist and may become foundational elements 
in new organization forms. Renault continues to exhibit characteristics of the 
multinational firm and the transnational firm even as it presents an emerging image of 
the GMBF. Rather than obliterating prior forms, strategic assembly at Renault includes 
not only accessing resources through acquisition, alliance, et al., but also includes 
building on the successful elements of prior forms.  It is not necessary to dig very far 
down into Renault to find structures, process or constituencies related to the 
multidivisional or transnational forms.  Indeed they seem to happily cohabit in one 
organization, provocatively suggesting an important role of firm history in strategic 
assembly. Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) concept of administrative heritage is borne out 
even as the form of the global organization evolves beyond their specific construct. 
CONCLUSION: OWNERSHIP AND ASSEMBLY IN A CO-EVOLVING WORLD 
Our model of strategic assembly offers new concepts at various levels of analysis. First, 
it provides specific guidance for the pragmatic assembly of GMBFs in today’s 
information-intensive, rapidly evolving business environment.  Second, it offers an 
internally consistent, theoretically and practically grounded model of an emerging type 
of multinational firm that has been hinted at since Gunnar Hedlund (1986) described his 
‘heterarchy’ as an emergent form of decentralized and geographically dispersed 
organization.  Third, its logic suggests that certain core concepts in strategic 
management and organizational economics should be rethought.  
 The resource-based and capability-based models of the firm focus on the idea 
that competitive advantage accrues to the firm that owns or controls internally the most 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable – and therefore rent-yielding – assets 
(Barney, 1991). Firms may use external markets to access generic assets, and may use 
alliances or equity participations to access complementary assets, but must own and 
control their strategic resources and capabilities for protection and for control of 
exploitative processes. The model recognizes the risk of ‘capability traps’ (Leonard-
Barton, 1992), but tends to view these as long term or end game conditions where 
large, successful firms eventually become incapable of responding to changed 
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conditions with new capabilities and resources.  Our approach to strategic assembly in 
the GMBF suggests that this is actually a common and critical issue, and one that goes 
beyond the idea of ‘dynamic capabilities’ for learning, or even iterative lifecycles for core 
capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), to propose reconstructing the majority of the 
multi business network in the face of profound, but inevitably to be supplanted, changes 
in the global environment. 
 Under rapidly changing or chaotic external conditions, firms that commit to 
specific resource stocks must expect to find mismatches of assets and market demand 
coming quickly and repeatedly.  Co-evolutionary precepts suggest that the pace of 
change of a firm must match or exceed the pace of change in the environment; 
otherwise, it is likely to be selected against and disappear in short order. This is, in fact, 
what we observe with the great majority of organizations. If they have the asset base to 
survive the selection pressures of start-up, they discover a need for new, different, 
evolved set of assets to face the pressures of an equally evolving environment – and 
frequently cannot meet this requirement and succumb. 
Thus, co-evolution in rapidly changing environments suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, firms should minimize their ownership of resources. Hard assets require large 
investments and make nimble response difficult. Turning an oil tanker, stopping a freight 
train, and the other metaphors for organizational inertia in large firms see mass as an 
unfortunate but unavoidable condition. But why must this be so? If strategic advantage 
is created by assembling the optimum set of assets for a particular condition, and lost 
when the conditions change and the assets cannot be reassembled, why not focus on 
speed and accuracy of assembly, on skills in bundling resources and capabilities, as the 
source of competitive advantage? Rents to any specific bundle may be temporary, but if 
the bundle can be disassembled and replaced by a “new and improved” GMBF with 
speed and accuracy of response, is this actually a problem? While some have viewed 
this phenomenon as “a falling apart of collective strategy” (Burgelman and Grove, 
2007), we note that disassembly holds the potential, at least, of a partially adaptive form 
of strategic management. 
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Our discussion suggests that a co-evolutionary perspective is essential to 
understanding strategic management in the modern global context. We also believe that 
a real options approach to multinational strategy (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994) shows 
increasing value, in that it generally encourages minimizing commitment to any one 
investment in order to retain flexibility in the face of environmental change. However, 
real options models support using a broad, diversified, range of investments in both 
place and type, with strategy reflected in decisions to exercise, continue, or allow to 
expire various options as the environmental uncertainty is resolved over time. We 
suggest instead a limited set of strategically directed decisions aimed at gaining short to 
medium term competitive advantage with the expectation that changes in the 
environment will not clarify existing conditions as much as they impose new, equally 
demanding and uncertain new conditions for competition. In a constantly and 
permanently chaotic environment, seeking success by optimizing for an immediately 
uncertain, but stable and emerging, context seems likely to be permanently frustrated. 
Using a modified version of resource- and capabilities-based theories, we suggest 
optimizing for today, but without unnecessarily binding ties, and relying on 
competencies at recognition of and fast response to environmental changes to provide 
sustained advantage.   
As a normative model for managers, we propose that preparation, flexibility, 
innovation, tolerance for uncertainty, and a global perspective will be the key 
capabilities for successful GMBFs in today’s global marketplace.  For scholars, we 
suggest that new combinations and interpretations of traditional and emerging theories 
of global strategic management are needed to understand how the complex, even 
chaotic, modern global market is placing new demands on global firms. Regular 
patterns of change, cycles in strategic relevance, and emerging equilibrium conditions – 
even in the distant future – all seem as quaint now as earlier models of home nation-
driven stability did a decade ago. Managing for, even preparing for, a future equilibrium 
seems to be as outdated as optimizing for the immediate conditions. Firms need to be 
prepared for sudden fundamental system-wide changes in the global competitive 
environment, and the application of strategic assembly principles as proposed here 
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Director of Industrial and Social Relations Department 
Director of Individual Management 
Director of Employee Health and Job Security 
HR Department Specialist I 
HR Department Specialist II 
Finance Department Specialist 
Head of Human Resources and External Relations 




Head of Department of Finance 
Manager After Sales Department 
6 Staff Engineers (various departments) 




Director, Emerging Markets 
Director, Worldwide Manufacturing 
Director Technology Transfer  
Director, Management Board France 
 









Table II: Key Elements of Strategy Assembly:  Group Renault and Renault-Turkey  
 
 
Asset Identification    Co-specialization and synergy of Group Renault  and Renault- 
     Turkey (Oyak-Renault and Mais International) ; Turkish Armed  
     Forces Pension Fund could provide access to patient capital,  
     and political and infrastructure relationships; francophone  
     cultural  and educational heritage; ambition of Turkish     
     government to enter Europe and westernize; growth and  
     trajectory of Turkish market for automobiles. 
 
 
Location Based Advantage   Early stage: social, political, and cost-base benefits of Turkey as  
     a key emerging market in Europe-Asia region; francophone and  
     anglophone educational infrastructure; strategic location (and  
     identity) of Turkey as bridge between Europe and Asia. 
     Later stage: fit between Renault Turkey and strategy of Group  
     Renault on a world-wide basis; flexible relationships with local  
     and regional suppliers; transportation and labor costs;   
     accumulated knowledge and capability in emerging markets. 
 
 
Transactional Structure    Equity joint ventures with prima partner/subsidiaries: Oyak- 
     Renault (44-51% held by Group Renault, and 56-49% by Oyak)  
     and Mais International (Oyak holds 51% of equity, 49% held by  
     Group Renault); Mais International is fully managed and   
     operated by Oyak-Renault. 
 
 
Strategic Purpose    Entry and domination of the Turkish marketplace utilizing product 
     platforms and capabilities accessed from Renault; development  
     of capabilities in emerging markets as well as manufacturing  
     scale; expansion into the regional and global emerging markets,  
     utilizing management capabilities (and scale); achieve a position  





Table III: Expatriation of Managers 
 Destination of the transfer of the Turkish 
Manager 









1998 Purchasing Director, Renault France Purchasing Director, 
Russia 
1999 Intenational Operations Division, Director of 
Industrial İnvestments, Renault France 
Still in France 
2001 Purchasing Manager, Renault France Purchasing Director, 
Turkey 
2004 Project Manager, Marketing  department 
Renault France  
Network Director, Turkey 
2005 Spare Parts Depart. Director, Dacia Still there 
2005  Project Director, Renault France Still France 
2004 Industrial Director, Renault Iran General Manager, Oyak 
Renault 
2005 Purchasing Director Renault Nissan Renault France 
2008 Department Manager, Technocentre France Still in France 
2008 Quality Manager, India Department Manager in 
Quality Directorate of 
Renault France 
2010 Engineering Department Manager, Russia Still in Russia 
2010 Plant Manager, Morocco  Still in Morroco 
 
 
 
 
